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The National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality
v. The Minister of Justice: A New Era in South
African Sexual Orientation Protection
I. Introduction
For decades South Africa has lagged behind the world in the
civil rights realm. During apartheid1 blacks were not considered
citizens of South Africa; they were forbidden from living in
prosperous urban areas and were often victims of police brutality.
However, with the demise of apartheid and adoption of a new
constitution,3 "South Africa's constitution is one of the most
progressive human rights instruments in the world."4  The
Constitution
constitutes a decisive break from a culture of apartheid and
racism to a constitutionally protected culture of openness and
democracy and universal human rights for South Africans of all
ages, classes and colours.... The aspiration of the future is
based on what is justifiable in an open and democratic society
based on freedom and equality.5
Although the South African government has attempted to enact
I Apartheid is defined as "racial segregation; specif' a policy of segregation and
political and economic discrimination against non-European groups in the Republic of
South Africa." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 94 (9th ed. 1991).
2 See Julie King & Paul Lansing, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation
Commission: The Conflict Between Individual Justice and National Healing in the
Post-Apartheid Age, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L& COMP. L. 753, 756 (1998). "Black people were
prevented from becoming owners of property or even residing in areas classified as
'white,' which constituted nearly 90% of the landmass of South Africa." Brink v.
Kitshoff NO, 1996 (4) SALR 197, para. 40 (CC).
3 See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996).
4 Voris Johnson, Comment, Making Words on a Page Become Everyday Life: A
Strategy to Help Gay Men and Lesbians Achieve Full Equality Under South Africa's
Constitution, 11 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 583, 585 (1997).
5 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice, No.
97/023677, 1998 SACLR LEXIS 6, at *39 (High Court, Witwatersrand Local Division,
Aug. 5, 1998), 1998 (6) BCLR 726 (W) [hereinafter National Coalition I] (quoting
Shabalala v. Attorney-General of the Transvaal, 1996 (1) SALR 725, para. 26, at (CC)).
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programs to heal the deep scars of racism,6 protecting homosexuals
from discrimination has not come about as quickly.
Internationally, a recent resurgence in equal protection
jurisprudence has led many nations to declare anti-sodomy laws
unconstitutional. In 1993, for example, Ireland decriminalized its
sodomy laws after the European Court of Human Rights held that
the prohibition violated the guarantee of privacy under the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.9 It is this innovation in constitutional
jurisprudence that the Constitutional Court of South Africa utilized
in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of
Justice (National Coalition II).'°
In National Coalition II, the Constitutional Court of the
Republic of South Africa held that certain statutory and common-
law offenses penalizing homosexual sex were unconstitutional
because they violated the equal protection, dignity, and privacy
clauses of the Constitution." The Court's decision reflected its
attempt to recognize "that we all have a right to a sphere of private
intimacy and autonomy which allows us to establish and nurture
human relationships without interference from the outside
6 In 1995 the Parliament adopted the Promotion of National Unity and
Reconciliation Act, which established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. See
King & Lansing, supra note 2, at 760. The purpose of the Commission is to promote
"national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the
conflicts and divisions of the past." Id. at 760-61; see § 2 of Promotion of National
Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.
7 See Michael Thomas, Teetering on the Brink of Equality: Sexual Orientation
and International Constitutional Protection, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 365, 380-83
(1997).
8 See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
9 See John Quinn, The Lost Language of the Irish Gay Male: Textualization in
Ireland's Law and Literature, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 553, 557-59 (1995); §§ 2-
4 of Criminal Law (Sexual Offenses) Act No. 20 of 1993; European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 8, 213
U.N.T.S. 221 (stating that "[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence").
1o Case CCT 11/98 (CC 1998) (visited Apr. 7, 1999) <http://www.law.
wits.ac.za/judgements/1 998/gayles.html> [hereinafter National Coalition 11].
" See id. para. 57.
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community.""
Part II of this Note examines the facts of the National
Coalition I and II decisions and discusses the rationale behind both
opinions.'3 Part III clarifies the jurisdictional aspects of the South
African Judicial System1 4 and discusses the development of South
African civil rights jurisprudence. 5 Part IV considers the effect of
the National Coalition II decision and contrasts the activist
position of the South African courts to the conservative approach
of the U.S. Supreme Court. 6 Finally, Part V concludes by
addressing the possible effects of the decision on homosexual
rights in South Africa.17
II. Statement of the Case
A. The Facts
The applicants18 initially brought suit against the respondents 9
in the High Court of the Witwatersrand Local Division to
invalidate the common law and statutory offenses of sodomy, as
12 Id. para. 32.
13 See infra notes 18-51 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 52-76 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 89-164 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 165-208 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
18 The first applicant, the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality, is a
"voluntary association of gay, lesbian, bi-sexual and transgendered persons comprising
seventy organizations and associations." National Coalition I, No. 97/023677, 1998
SACLR LEXIS 6, at *22-*23 (High Court, Witwatersrand Local Division, Aug. 5,
1998). The second applicant, the South African Human Rights Commission, was
established by section 184 of the Constitution Act of 1996 to "promote the protection,
development and attainment of human rights." Id. at *23 (quoting section 7(l)(e) of the
Human Rights Commission Act 54 of 1994). The Commission serves as a watchdog to
ensure equality and reports on infringements of fundamental rights. See Thomas, supra
note 7, at 379.
19 The respondents, the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Safety and Security,
are "responsible for the administration and enforcement of the Criminal Procedure Act,
the Sexual Offences Act and the Security Officers Act." National Coalition 1, 1998
SACLR LEXIS, at *24. The third respondent, the Attorney-General of Witwatersrand,
controls prosecutions for violations of the challenged laws. See id.
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well as the indirect statutory prohibitions on homosexual sex.20
The applicants argued that "the statutory and common law
offences which criminalise [sic] sexual acts engaged in between
male persons, and statutes which discriminate on the basis of
convictions for those acts" were unconstitutional because the laws
applied different standards to individuals based on their sexual
orientation.2 ' The applicants based their constitutional argument
on the guarantee of equality in the Constitution.22  They
specifically challenged the constitutionality of the common law
offense of sodomy,23 section 20A of the Sexual Offences Act, 4 the
common law offense of commission of an unnatural sexual act
between men,25 and the inclusion of sodomy as an item in schedule
1 to both the Criminal Procedure Act 26 and the Security Officers
Act.27
21
After hearing the applicants' arguments, the High Court
concluded that the challenged offenses were unconstitutional.
Following the High Court's decision, the case was automatically
referred to the Constitutional Court for confirmation review. °
20 See id.
21 Id.
22 See id. at *36-*38; see also S. AFR. CONST. § 9(1) (stating that "[e]veryone is
equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law").
23 See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text (discussing Sexual Offences Act
23 of 1957).
25 See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
26 See Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. This Act provides that the police
expand search and arrest powers against anyone suspected of committing a crime
contained in the schedule to the Act. See National Coalition 1, 1998 SACLR LEXIS, at
*30-*32.
27 See Security Officers Act 92 of 1987. This Act prohibits anyone convicted of
sodomy from becoming or continuing to be a security officer. See National Coalition I,
1998 SACLR LEXIS, at *32.
28 The respondents did not present a written argument at either the High Court or
the Constitutional Court hearing. See National Coalition II, Case CCT 11/98, para. 6
(CC 1998) (visited Apr. 7, 1999) <http://www.law.wits.ac.za/judgements/1998/
gayles.html>.
29 See National Coalition 1, 1998 SACLR LEXIS, at *89.
30 See National Coalition II, Case CCT 11/98 para. 1. Pursuant to President
Mandela's orders, at the confirmation hearing, the respondent State Attorney made no
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Upon review of the High Court ruling, the Constitutional Court
confirmed the unconstitutionality of anti-sodomy laws and further
expanded the protection afforded to homosexuals.'
B. The High Court's Decision
The High Court structured its opinion by (1) outlining the
history of and policy reasons for the challenged offenses;32 (2)
discussing the history of the Constitution and recent South African
and international cases dealing with equal protection
jurisprudence;3 3 and (3) applying equal protection analysis to
determine the constitutionality of the challenged laws.34
Throughout its analysis the court focused on the principle of
equality and the great importance it must be given in face of the
country's segregated past.35
The High Court analyzed the constitutionality of anti-sodomy
laws by utilizing progressive equal protection jurisprudence.
South Africa was the first nation to explicitly protect sexual
orientation within the equal protection clause of its Constitution.36
The drafters, furthermore, considered the country's long history of
oppression of minorities, and the Constitution greatly emphasized
the importance of equality in an open and democratic society.37
written argument and was present only to answer questions of the Court. See id. para. 6.
The Court permitted the Centre for Applied Legal Studies to present an oral argument as
amicus curiae. See id.
31 See id. para. 32.
32 See National Coalition 1, 1998 SACLR LEXIS, at *25-*36.
31 See id. at *36-*63. The court performed a thorough review of equal protection
jurisprudence in the United States and Canada. See id. at *50-*53.
34 See id. at *63-*88.
15 See id. at *56-*61. During apartheid the government placed different racial and
ethnic groups in specific geographic regions. See Group Areas Act 41 of 1950. All
races were required to carry passes identifying the geographic areas where they were
allowed to live. See King & Lansing, supra note 2, at 756. These passes allowed the
police to prevent blacks from migrating to urban areas unless they had government-
approved jobs. See id.; see also Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents
Act of 1952 (consolidating pass laws and new identification requirements for blacks).
36 See Johnson, supra note 4, at 584; S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 9(3).
37 See S. AFR. CONST. pmbl. "We, the people of South Africa... adopt this
Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic so as to ... [h]eal the divisions of the
past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental
human rights." Id.
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In light of this heavy historical burden, the court evaluated
each challenged law and deemed them all to be unconstitutional.38
The court also reviewed the justifications proposed in analogous
U.S. cases39 for limiting homosexual rights. Rejecting these, the
Court characterized the U.S. rationales as "historical antipathy,
personal revulsion, religious conviction, the prevailing opinion in
society, and the protection of the morals of the people." 40 In light
of the new fundamental rights guaranteed in the South African
Constitution, the court found U.S. justifications insufficient to
limit necessary personal freedoms.4'
C. The Constitutional Court's Decision
After reviewing the High Court's ruling, the Constitutional
Court analyzed the constitutionality of the common law anti-
sodomy laws under the doctrines of equality, dignity, and
privacy.42  The Court concluded that anti-sodomy legislation
essentially reduced gay men to "unapprehended felons. 43 In lieu
of the recent trend toward decriminalizing sodomy in western
democracies, the Court found no justification in the "jurisprudence
of other open and democratic societies based on human dignity,
equality and freedom to continue the prohibition on sodomy.""
38 See National Coalition 1, 1998 SACLR LEXIS, at *89.
39 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding- that the right of
homosexuals to engage in consensual sodomy could not be a fundamental right because
the history and tradition of the United States has been to criminalize sodomy).
40 National Coalition 1, 1998 SACLR LEXIS, at *65.
41 See id. at *65-*66. "Attitudes emanating from religious belief (a personal and
not a State concern in South Africa) and popular opinion cannot constitute a justification
for the continued operation of the crime of sodomy in a face of the explicit constitutional
guarantees." Id. at *66.
42 See National Coalition II, Case CCT 11/98, paras. 15, 28-29 (CC 1998) (visited
Apr. 7, 1999) <http://www.law.wits.ac.za/judgements/1998/gayles.html>.
43 Edwin Cameron, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Test Case for
Human Rights, 110 S. AFR. L.J. 450, 455 (1993). "[G]ay men are at the risk of arrest,
prosecution and conviction of the offence of sodomy simply because they seek to
engage in sexual conduct which is part of their experience of being human." National
Coalition H, Case CCT 11/98 para. 28.
44 National Coalition II, Case CCT 11/98 para 39. Sodomy between consenting
males in private was decriminalized in England and Wales in 1967 and in Scotland in
1980. In 1994 the German government repealed its anti-sodomy laws. See id. para. 44.
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After finding the common law prohibition of sodomy to be
unconstitutional, the Court necessarily found its inclusion on
schedule 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act and the Security Officers
Act to be unconstitutional.45
The Court also discussed the constitutionality of Section 20A
of the Sexual Offenses Act of 1957.46 Because the provision failed
to criminalize similar acts between women, the Court concluded
the discrimination infringed on the constitutionally protected arena
of sexual orientation.47 Therefore, like the common law offense of
sodomy, the Court concluded that the statutory offense amounted
to unfair discrimination.48
Finally, the Court addressed its ability to make a retrospective
order of invalidity for all the offenses.49 Section 172(1)(b)(i) of the
Constitution gives the Court the authority to "make any order that
is just and equitable, including an order limiting the retrospective
effect of the declaration of invalidity."5 ° The Court concluded that,
in the interest of good government, the, just and equitable remedy
would be to order all the challenged offenses inconsistent with the
Constitution.",
Thirty-two of the member states of the Council of Europe had decriminalized sodomy
by 1995. See id. para. 45. Additionally, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada have held
anti-sodomy laws to be unconstitutional. See id. paras. 46-51.
45 See id. para. 77.
46 See id. para. 76; see also Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957 (S. Afr.).
17 See National Coalition II, Case CCT 11/98 para. 76.
48 See id. "The impact intended and caused by the provision is flagrant, intense,
demeaning and destructive of self-realisation [sic], sexual expression and sexual
orientation." Id.
49 See id. para. 83. When additional provisions are made to the constitution, a pre-
existing law that is later determined to be unconstitutional based on these changes was
unconstitutional at the moment of inception of the new constitutional provisions. See id.
para. 84. Therefore, under a retrospective order, any conviction of a violation of the pre-
existing law must be set aside. See id. paras. 95-96.
50 S. AFR. CONST. ch. 8, § 172(1)(b)(i).
"' See National Coalition II, Case CCT 11/98 para. 106. In order to give the ruling
effect, anyone convicted of a challenged offense must appeal his conviction through the
courts to get it overturned. See id. para. 97. The Court limited the order to cover only
consensual sodomy so that convictions for male rape could not be overturned. See id.
paras. 98, 106.
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III. Background
In deciding National Coalition II, the Court used a constitution
drafted with the intent to repair a country ravaged by racism and
bitterness.52 As the High Court noted, "[T]he Constitution was
intended to be a 'ringing and decisive break with a past which
perpetuated inequality and irrational discrimination and arbitrary
governmental and executive action."'53 While the Constitutional
Court could not rely on a long history of equal protection
jurisprudence, the Court was able to gain guidance from a few
Constitutional Court cases that interpreted the scope of, rights
under the Bill of Rights. 4
A. The Jurisdiction of the South African Courts
While there are some similarities between the U.S. and the
South African judicial systems, there are also significant
differences. Under the South African Constitution, the judiciary is
separated into five court systems: (1) the Constitutional Court; (2)
the Supreme Court of Appeal; (3) The High Courts; (4) the
Magistrates' Court; and (5) any other court established or
recognized by an Act of Parliament.5
Each court system has its own jurisdictional limitations.56 The
Constitution confers three types of jurisdiction on the High
Courts. 7  The High Courts have jurisdiction over any
''constitutional matter" not explicitly in the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Constitutional Court.58 "Constitutional matters" are defined
as "issue[s] involving the interpretation, protection or enforcement
of the Constitution."59  In addition, the High Courts have
52 See National Coalition I, No. 97/023677, 1998 SACLR LEXIS 6, at '*38-*40
(High Court, Witwatersrand Local Division, Aug. 5, 1998).
53 Id. at *41 (quoting S v. Mhlunga, 1995 (3) SALR 867, para. 8, at 873-74 (CC)).
14 See id. at *41-*45.
55 See S. AER. CONST. ch. 8, § 167.
56 See lain Currie, Jurisdiction and Procedures in Bill of Rights Litigation, in
JOHAN DE WAAL ET AL., THE BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK ch. 5, § 5.1 (2d ed. 1999)
(visited Apr. 7, 1999) <http://www.law.wits.ac.za/court/constjuris.pdf>.
"7 See id. § 5.2(b)(iii).
58 See id.
59 S. AnR. CONST. ch. 8, § 167(7).
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jurisdiction over any matters conferred on them by national
legislation.6 The final realm of jurisdiction is residual or inherent
jurisdiction conferred by section 173 of the Constitution.6
Pursuant to section 173, "[t]he Constitutional Court, Supreme
Court of Appeal, and the High Courts have the inherent power to
protect and regulate their own process, and to develop the common
law, taking into account the interests of justice. '62  These
jurisdictional grants give a High Court the power to hear any
matter in its geographic region, unless specifically excluded from
jurisdiction by the Constitution or legislation.63
Analogous to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Constitutional
Court is the final interpreter of the Constitution.64 However, the
Constitutional Court jurisdictional grant is distinguishable from
the U.S. Supreme Court because it is divided into concurrent and
exclusive jurisdiction. 6 "The Constitutional Court has exclusive
jurisdiction only over constitutional disputes between organs or
state [sic] at national or provincial levels of government; disputes
over the constitutionality of provincial or Parliamentary Bills;
determination whether Parliament or the President has failed to
comply with a constitutional duty and the certification of
provincial constitutions. 66  When acting within its exclusive
jurisdiction, the Court acts as a court of first instance.6' Because of
the narrow jurisdictional grant, private individuals will seldom
have direct access to the court."
Consequently, the majority of cases reach the Constitutional
Court through its concurrent jurisdiction.69  The Court has
60 See id. § 171.
61 See id. § 173; see also Currie, supra note 56, § 5.2(b)(iii).
62 S. AFR. CONST. ch. 8, § 173.
63 See Currie, supra note 56, § 5.2(b)(iii). Normally the High Court is the first
court in which a constitutional dispute is heard. See id. § 5.2(b)(i).
64 See S. AFR. CONST. ch. 8, § 167(3)(a).
65 See Currie, supra note 56, § 5.2(b)(i).
66 Id. (citing S. AFR. CONST. ch. 8, § 167(4)).
67 See id.
61 See id.
69 See id. The Constitutional Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the High
Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal. See id.
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concurrent jurisdiction to hear disputes over the constitutionality
of an Act of Parliament, provincial legislation, or delegated
legislation.70 A constitutional challenge to an act of Parliament is
first heard in the local High Court and then can be appealed to
either the Supreme Court of Appeal or the Constitutional Court.7'
Regardless of whether the High Court or the Supreme Court
invalidates an act of Parliament, a provincial act, or any conduct of
the president, the order is unenforceable until confirmed by the
Constitutional Court.7 ' As such, "the Constitutional Court is
primarily an appellate court and not a court of first instance."
7
While the Constitutional Court reviewed the constitutionality
of both statutory and common law offenses relating to sodomy in
National Coalition 11,74 the Constitution only gives the Court the
explicit jurisdiction to review acts of Parliament. 7' The Court,
however, concluded it had the inherent jurisdiction to decide the
constitutionality of the common law offense of sodomy in order to
review the constitutionality of the inclusion of sodomy on the
schedules to the two Parliament Acts.76
B. The Challenged Laws
The applicants challenged three laws that directly criminalized
homosexuality. The main challenge was to the common law
70 See id. The interim Constitution granted the Constitutional Court the exclusive
jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of acts of Parliament. See S. AFR. CONST.
(Act 200 of 1993) §§ 98(2)(c), 101(3) [hereinafter 1993 CONST.]. The new Constitution,
however, eliminated this authority. See S. AFR. CONST.; Currie, supra note 56,
§ 5.2(b)(i). Therefore, human rights practitioners can no longer gain direct access to the
Court when challenging an Act of Parliament. See Currie, supra note 56, § 5.2(b)(i).
71 See Currie, supra note 56, § 5.2(b)(ii).
72 See S. AFR. CONST. ch. 8, § 167(5).
73 Currie, supra note 56, § 5.2(b)(i).
71 See National Coalition II, Case CCT 11/98, para. 9 (CC 1998) (visited Apr. 7,
1999) <http://www.law.wits.ac.za/judgements/1998/gayles.html>.
75 See S. AFR. CONST. ch. 8, § 167(4).
76 See National Coalition II, Case CCT 11/98 para. 9.
71 See id. para. 1. In addition, the applicants charged that two laws that penalized
persons previously convicted of homosexual behavior were unconstitutional. See supra
notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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offense of sodomy.78 South African law defines sodomy as
"unlawful and intentional sexual relations per anum between
human males."79 Therefore, by definition, the law criminalized
male homosexual conduct, even if between consenting adults.80
While the common law offense of an unnatural sexual act
attempted to criminalize certain conduct, it did not clearly define
those prohibited acts.8' An unnatural sexual offense is circularly
defined as "the unlawful and intentional commission of an
unnatural sexual act by one person with another." 2 Under this
definition, the common law had criminalized various consensual
sex acts between men, including mutual masturbation, inter-
femoral (thigh) sex, and oral sex."
In addition to challenging common law offenses, the applicants
also argued that the statutory offense criminalizing homosexual
sex under section 20A of the Sexual Offences Act of 1957 was
unconstitutional.M This statute criminalized "[a]cts committed
between men at a party and which are calculated to stimulate
sexual passion or to give sexual gratification." 5  The statute
further defined "party" as any instance where more than two
people are present8 6  The Court did not attempt to determine a
rationale for the law but instead simply noted the vagueness of the
law. 7 In effect, the law could criminalize any openly male
78 See National Coalition II, Case CCT 11/98 paras. 4, 9.
" National Coalition I, No. 97/023677, 1998 SACLR LEXIS 6, at *25 (High
Court, Witwatersrand Local Division, Aug. 5, 1998) (citing P.M.A. HUNT, SouTH
AFRICAN CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (J.R.L. Milton ed., 3d ed. 1996)).
80 The applicants only sought constitutional review of consensual, non-commercial
homosexual sex between males taking place in private. See National Coalition 1H, Case
CCT 11/98 para. 67. Neither anal nor oral sex between a male and female, nor between
two females, was punishable under South African law. See id. para. 14.
81 See National Coalition 1, 1998 SACLR LEXIS, at *26-*27.
82 Id. at *26 (citing HUNT, supra note 79).
83 See id. at *27.
84 See National Coalition 1H, Case CCT 11/98 para. 1.
85 § 20A(1) of Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957.
86 See id. § 20A(2).
87 See National Coalition 11, Case CCT 11/98 para. 75. While reviewing several
theories for the rationale of this law, however, the High Court concluded that the statute
was designed "to discourage orgiastic practices to which homosexuality seems often to
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
homosexual act, including kissing."8
C. The South African Bill of Rights
The South African Constitution is similar to the U.S.
Constitution in that the Bill of Rights 9 is the foundation for the
rights of the people.9° As the introduction to the Bill of Rights
states, "[T]his Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in
South Africa. It enshrines the rights of all people in our country
and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and
freedom."9' Unlike the U.S. Constitution, however, the South
Africa Constitution imposes an additional affirmative obligation
on the government: "[T]he State must respect, protect, promote
and fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights." 92 Therefore, it becomes
the responsibility of the Constitutional Courts to determine
whether the State is violating the Bill of Rights and to
affirmatively attempt to ensure that the law provides full
protection for the citizens.93
Additionally, the Constitution provides the Court with the
authority to eliminate or modify any particular law or the common
law to ensure that the Bill of Rights is applied equally to all
citizens.9 4  "In applying the provisions of the Bill of Rights to
natural and juristic persons.., a court in order to give effect to a
right in the Bill, must apply, or where necessary, develop, the
common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to
fall prey." National Coalition 1, 1998 SACLR LEXIS, at *29.
88 See National Coalition II, Case CCT 11/98 para. 75.
89 See S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2.
90 See National Coalition 1, 1998 SACLR LEXIS, at *36.
91 S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 7(1).
92 Id. § 7(2). "The Constitution creates an ethos of accountability. The State and
its officials, where appropriate, must be called to answer for their actions and must be
subject to critical scrutiny." National Coalition 1, 1998 SACLR LEXIS, at *38 (relying
on S v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391, at 431 (CC)).
93 See National Coalition 1, 1998 SACLR LEXIS, at *37. "A court in order to
.give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or where necessary, develop the common
law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right." S. AFR. CONST. ch.
2, § 8(3)(a).
94 See S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 8.
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that right."95  These constitutional provisions provide the
Constitutional Court with a wide array of power and authority to
develop and administer the law. 96
However, under some circumstances, the State is allowed to
limit the protection of the Bill of Rights.97 Pursuant to section 36
of the Constitution (the Limitations Clause):
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of
law of general application to the extent that the limitation is
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into
account all relevant factors including
a) the nature of the right;
b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.98
Therefore, the Bill of Rights analysis is a two-prong test: (1)
whether the State has violated a guaranteed right; and, if so, (2)
whether the violation, is justified under the Limitations Clause.99
To facilitate their analysis, the Constitutional Court has
adopted certain principles of constitutional interpretation to help
determine the full implications of the Bill of Rights. These same
principles guide the Court in determining when the State is
satisfying the protections mandated by the Constitution.' °° The
Constitution itself is the starting point for Bill of Rights
interpretation:
95 Id. § 8(3).
96 Cf. U.S. CONST. arts. I-III (dividing the power to develop, administer, and
review the law between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches).
97 See S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 36.
98 Id. § 36(1).
99 A court reviewing a Bill of Rights matter must conduct a balancing test to
determine whether it is justified to limit the right. See National Coalition II, Case CCT
11/98, para. 33 (CC 1998) (visited Apr. 7, 1999) <http://www.law.wits.ac.za/
judgements/1998/gayles.html>. The application of the limitations clause involves a
process of "weighing up of competing values, and ultimately an assessment based on
proportionality... which calls for the balancing of different interests." Id.
100 See id. para. 34.
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1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or
forum
a) must promote the values that underlie an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom;
b) must consider international law; and
c) may consider foreign law."'
Using section 39(1) as a foundation, the Constitutional Court
concentrated on equal protection analysis developed in prior South
African cases and under foreign law.1
0 2
D. Equality under the Bill of Rights
One essential right in the Bill of Rights is equality.
Throughout the Constitution there are various references to the
importance and centrality of equality and fairness in the "New
South Africa."' 3  Interpreting the scope of equal protection is
crucial, therefore, in determining the degree of equality in the
country.'4 The equal protection clause provides in part:
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal
protection and benefit of the law ....
(3) The State may not unfairly discriminate directly or
indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including
race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social
origin, colour [sic], sexual orientation,0 5 age, disability,
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth ....
101 S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 39(1).
102 See National Coalition II, Case CCT 11/98 para. 17.
10 "We, the people of South Africa, ... [l]ay the foundations for a democratic and
open society in which... every citizen is equally protected by law." S. AFR. CONST.
pmbl. (emphasis added). "The Republic of South Africa is one sovereign democratic
state founded on the following values: (a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality
and advancement of human rights and freedoms." Id. ch. 2,, § l(a) (emphasis added).
"(The Bill of Rights] enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the
democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom." Id. § 7(1) (emphasis
added).
'o See National Coalition II, Case CCT 11/98 para. 16.
0 The Court gave a broad definition to the concept of sexual orientation to include
bisexuals, transsexuals, and persons who were erotically attracted to a member of their
own sex on a single occasion. See id. para. 20.
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(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in
subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the
discrimination is fair. 0 6
Accordingly, to determine whether a law impairs equality,
courts analyze the constitutionality of a challenged law based on
the unfairness of that law on a certain group.107
The Constitutional Court attempted to clarify the policy behind
the equality clause in Brink v. Kitshoff NO.'08 In Brink the
applicants argued that section 44 of the Insurance Act'0 9 violated
the Bill of Rights because it discriminated against married
women.'° After reviewing equal protection analysis in the United
States, India, and Canada, the Court concluded that the definition
of true equality is necessarily the product of that particular
nation's history."' Thus,. the Court focused on the role apartheid
had played to disenfranchise black South Africans and to keep
them from. playing an equal role in the development of the
country.1"2
Although the Court concluded that the elimination of
systematic racial discrimination was the primary rationale for the
106 S. AlR. CONST. ch. 2, § 9(1)-(5) (emphasis added). Under the 1993
Constitution, the equal protection provisions were found in § 8(1)-(5). See 1993 CONST.
Therefore, certain Constitutional Court cases interpreting the equal protection clause cite
section 8 instead of the current section 9. See, e.g., Prinsloo v. Van Der Linde, 1997 (3)
SALR 1012 (CC). While there are minor differences in wording between the statute, the
courts interprets the clauses similarly. See National Coalition H1, Case CCT 11/98 para.
15. Compare 1993 CONST. with S. AFR. CONST.
"'o See National Coalition II, Case CCT 11/98 para. 17. "The drafters realised [sic]
that it was necessary both to proscribe such forms of discrimination and to permit
positive steps to redress the effects of such discrimination." Id.
108 1996 (4) SALR 197 (CC).
109 § 44 of Insurance Act 27 of 1943.
"o See Brink, 1996 (4) SALR para. 19. The applicants alleged that in certain
circumstances the Insurance Act deprived women of the benefits of life insurance
policies ceded to them by their husbands. See id.
" I See id. paras. 35-39. "Our history is of particular relevance to the concept of
equality." Id. para. 40.
I2 See id. para. 40. "The policy of apartheid, in law and in fact, systematically
discriminated against black people in all aspects of social life .... It is in the light of
that history and the enduring legacy that it bequeathed that the equality clause needs to
be interpreted." Id.
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equality clause,"3 it also concluded that the theory of equality
should apply with equal force to all groups:
In drafting section 8, the drafters recognised [sic] that'
systematic patterns of discrimination on grounds other than race
have caused, and may continue to cause, considerable harm ....
Section 8 was adopted then in the recognition that
discrimination against people who are members of disfavoured
[sic] groups can lead to patterns of group disadvantage and
harm. Such discrimination is unfair: it builds and entrenches
inequality amongst different groups in our society."
14
Instead of adjusting the level of scrutiny in accordance with
the history or severity of discrimination, the Court concluded it
should apply equal scrutiny to any policy that served directly or
indirectly to discriminate based on a protected ground. "'
Therefore, although gender discrimination was not as widely
condemned as racial discrimination, the Constitutional Court did
not lower its degree of scrutiny when analyzing whether the
equality clause had been violated."
6
The judiciary further attempted to outline the significance of
equality in the Bill of Rights by defining the term "unfair
discrimination."" 7  In Harksen v. Lane NO,"8 the applicant
challenged the constitutionality of the Insolvency Act.' 19 This Act
required that upon the death of an insolvent spouse, the entire
estate of that spouse would be sequestered to the control of a state
trustee.20 The effect of the sequestration was to vest the property
of the surviving solvent spouse to the state as if it was the property
113 See id.
114 Id. paras. 41-42.
"' See id. para. 44; cf. Virginia Military Institute v. United States, 508 U.S 946,
116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (holding that intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny
should apply to cases involving discrimination based on gender).
116 See Brink, 1996 (4) SALR para. 44.
"17 National Coalition I, Case CCT 11/98, para. 17 (CC 1998) (visited Apr. 7,
1999) <http://www.law.wits.ac.za/judgements/1998/gayles.html>.
I18 1998 (1) SALR 300 (CC).
"l9 See id.; Insolvency Act 24 of 1936.
120 See Insolvency Act 24 § 20(1).
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of the sequestered estate. 2' The applicants alleged that the
"vesting provision constitute[d] unequal treatment of solvent
spouses and discriminate[d] unfairly against them."'
122
The Court began its analysis by laying the ground work "to
identify the criteria that separate legitimate differentiation from
differentiation that has crossed the border of constitutional
impermissibility."'' 3 Instead of applying sweeping interpretations
of equality or adopting foreign interpretations, the Court decided
that the equality doctrine should develop incrementally.2 2 The
Court divided treatment of classes by the government into "mere
differentiation" and "unfair discrimination.' 2 5  Mere
differentiation is the differentiation that is impossible for the
government to eliminate. 26 "In regard to mere differentiation the
constitutional state is expected to act in a rational manner.'
12 7
Thus, mere differentiation violates the constitutional requirement
of equality only when no rational relationship exists between the
different treatment and the government purpose for the
differentiation. 128
The Court then attempted to distinguish mere differentiation
from discrimination. 2 1 When the government differentiates
against a class specifically protected in section 9(3), discrimination
is established."3o However, the law may still be constitutional if
121 See id. § 21(1).
122 Harksen, 1998 (1) SALR para. 40.
123 Id. para. 44 (quoting Prinsloo v. Van Der Linde, 1997 (3) SALR 1012, para. 17
(Cc)).
124 See id. para. 42. "While our country, unfortunately, has great experience in
constitutionalising [sic] inequality, it is a newcomer when it comes to ensuring
constitutional respect for equality." Prinsloo v. Van Der Linde, 1997 (3) SALR 1012,
para. 20 (CC) (reviewing various considerations in determining whether a law amounted
to mere differentiation or constituted unfair discrimination).
125 Harksen, 1998 (1) SALR para. 44 (relying on Prinsloo v. Van Der Linde, 1997
(3) SALR 1012, paras. 17, 23, 24-26 (CC)).
126 See id.
127 Id. The rational requirement prevents governments from acting in an arbitrary
manner manifesting "naked preferences." Id.
1218 See id. para. 44.
129 See id. paras. 44-45.
130 See id. Differentiation against a § 9(3) protected class is presumed to constitute
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the government can show either that the discrimination is fair or
that it is justified under the Limitations Clause.13
Even if the differentiation is not based on the specified
grounds, it can still constitute discrimination if it distinguishes
between people based on grounds analogous to the protected
grounds found in section 9(3).132 In determining what factors to
consider when deciding if a class is similar to the protected
classes, the Court focused on South Africa's history of the racial
discrimination.'33 During apartheid the government discriminated
against minorities based on their characteristics and attributes.
13 4
Consequently, the Court defined discrimination as "treating
persons differently in a way which impairs their fundamental
dignity as human beings, who are inherently equal in dignity.' 35
Finally, the Court addressed when discrimination becomes
unfair discrimination.'36 If the law discriminates on a specified
ground, the unfairness is presumed.'37  If, however, the
unfair discrimination. See id. para. 46.
131 See id.; see also supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (discussing the
limitations clause and its application).
132 Harksen, 1998 (1) SALR para. 47. "What the specified grounds have in
common is that they have been used (or misused) in the past (both in South Africa and
elsewhere) to categorize, marginalise [sic] and often oppress persons who have had, or
who have been associated with, these attributes or characteristics." Id. para. 50.
133 See id. para. 47. The Court reasoned that since apartheid had denied blacks
recognition of their humanity and inherent dignity, the Constitution's drafters wanted to
protect against similar discrimination. See id. "Section [9(3)] seeks to prevent the
unequal treatment of people based on such criteria which may, amongst other things,
result in the construction of patterns of disadvantage such as has occurred only too
visibly in our history." Id. para. 50.
134 See id. para. 47. The Court failed to outline what characteristics and attributes
placed individuals in a section 9(3) analogous class. See id.
13" Id. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court refused to limit protection to
discrimination based upon immutable characteristics. "The temptation to force [the
unspecified grounds] into neatly self-contained categories should be resisted." Id. para.
50; cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that
requiring a special use permit based on an immutable characteristic, mental retardation,
violated the equal protection clause in absence of any rational basis in the record for
believing that a group home would pose any special threat).
136 See Harksen, 1998 (1) SALR paras. 47, 51-54.
137 See id para. 47. Section 9(5) creates the presumption of unfairness.
"Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it
is established that the discrimination is fair." S. AER. CONST. ch. 2, § 9(5).
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discrimination is not based on a specified ground, the Court looks
to see whether the impact of the law was unfair.' The Court
outlined various factors to consider when determining whether the
impact of a law is unfair towards a certain person or group. 39 The
factors include; (1) "the position of the complainants in society;"' 40
(2) the history of past discrimination against the complainants; (3)
the nature of the law and its purpose;4 1 and (4) any other relevant
factors that show the law impaired the complainant's fundamental
human dignity. 142
Since the applicants in National Coalition II challenged a law
that specifically targeted homosexuals, unfair discrimination was
presumed. 14  Additionally, the respondents failed to offer any
rationale as to why the discrimination was justified under the
limitation clause.' 4 Nonetheless, the Court reviewed both the
unfairness of the law to homosexuals and possible reasons why the
law might be justified. 45
... See Harksen, 1998 (1) SALR para. 51. The court concluded:
The prohibition on unfair discrimination in the interim Constitution seeks not
only to avoid discrimination against people who are members of a
disadvantaged groups. It seeks more than that. At the heart of the prohibition
of unfair discrimination lies a recognition that the purpose of our new
Constitution and democratic order is the establishment of a society in which all
human beings will be accorded equal dignity and respect regardless of their
membership of [sic] particular groups. The achievement of such a society in
the context of our deeply inegalitarian past will not be easy, but that that is the
goal of the Constitution should not be forgotten or overlooked.
Id. (quoting President of the Republic of South Africa v. Hugo, 1997 (4) SALR 1 (CC)).
"I See id. para. 52.
140 Id.
'1 If the purpose for the law is not directly aimed at discriminating against the
complainants but instead at "achieving a worthy and important societal goal, such
as... the furthering of equality for all" then the Court is free to consider the law to
have, in fact, fairly impacted on the complainants. Id.
142 See id.
141 See National Coalition II, Case CCT 11/98, paras. 26-27 (CC 1998) (visited
Apr. 7, 1999) <http://www.law.wits.ac.za/judgements/1998/gayles.html>.
'" See id. para. 37. The onus of justifying a Bill of Rights limitation is on the party
seeking to uphold the limitation. See National Coalition I, No. 97/023677, 1998
SACLR LEXIS 6, at *47 (High Court, Witwatersrand Local Division, Aug. 5, 1998).
145 See National Coalition II, Case CCT 11/98 paras. 22-25, 33-57. The
Constitutional Court never specifically revealed why this analysis was necessary. See
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E. The Right to Dignity
The right to dignity is closely related to the right of equality. 1
46
Section 10 of the Constitution, the dignity provision, states:
"Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity
respected and protected."'' 47  While there is no one definition of
dignity, 48 courts usually define the term based on the specific
circumstances. In State v. Makwanyane, 49 the Court considered the
right to dignity in relation to the death penalty.5 ° Relying on U.S.
constitutional law, the Court concluded: "The fatal constitutional
infirmity in the punishment of death is that it treats members of the
human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and
discarded."''
The National Coalition I Court analogized the concept of
human dignity as used in Makwanyane to the present case. '  In
order to protect the value of human dignity, at a minimum the
Constitution requires the government to "acknowledge the value and
worth of all individuals as members of our society."'53 Therefore, if
a law attacks and degrades a person in the society simply for who he
is and what he represents, the law would violate the concept of the
right of dignity. 
5 4
id. However, the High Court reasoned:
A court faced with the matter of great public interest and importance in which
many potentially interested groups (such as the Churches) have received no
notice of the application, should do its best to place itself in the position of the
legislature and the law-enforcing arms of the State in order to determine, as best
it can, what there is to be said in favour of the legislation.
National Coalition !, 1998 SACLR LEXIS, at *47.
146 See National Coalition I, Case CCT 11/98 para. 30.
14 S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 10.
148 See National Coaltition H, Case CCT 11/98 para. 28.
14 1995 (3) SALR 391 (CC).
's0 See id. paras. 57-62.
'5' Id. para. 57 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 230 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
152 See National Coalition H, Case CCT 11/98 paras. 33-35.
153 Id.
154 See id.
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F. Right to Privacy
The right to privacy is enshrined in section 14 of the
Constitution. 5  The privacy clause provides: "Everyone has the
right to privacy, which includes the right not to have - (a) their
person or home searched; (b) their property searched; (c) their
possessions seized; or (d) the privacy of their communications
infringed."'
5 6
Although interrelated with the rights of equality and dignity, the
protection afforded to privacy is not as great as that of the other
rights. 57
In Bernstein v. Bester,'58 the applicants argued that sections
417 and 418 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973,' requiring the
disclosure of private, personal financial information, were an
invasion of privacy and, therefore, unconstitutional.' 6°  In
addressing this right to privacy claim, the Court limited the scope
of its analysis to the features necessary for an individual to have
personal autonomy. 16' The right to privacy must also be viewed in
relation to the larger community. 162 Thus, as an individual "moves
into communal relations and activities such as business and social
interaction, the scope of personal space shrinks accordingly."'
163
Consequently, if a law invades a person's sphere of private
intimacy and autonomy, it breaches his right to privacy. '64
155 See S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 14.
156 Id.
157 See National Coalition II, Case CCT 11/98 para. 32; cf. Powell v. State, 510
S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998) (holding anti-sodomy laws in Georgia unconstitutional as a
violation of the state constitution's right to privacy).
"1 1996 (2) SALR 751 (CC).
159 Companies Act 61 of 1973.
'60 See Bernstein, 1996 (2) SALR para. 56, at 784-85. These sections provide for
the summoning and examination of persons during the winding-up of a company. See
§ 417(1) of Companies Act.
161 See Bernstein, 1996 (2) SALR para. 67, at 788. The right of privacy shields
"only the inner sanctum of a person, such as his/her family life, sexual preference and
home environment." Id.
162 See id. para. 67, at 788-89.
163 Id.
'" See National Coalition I, Case CCT 11/98, para. 32 (CC 1998) (visited Apr. 7,
1999) <http://www.law.wits.ac.za/judgements/1998/gayles.html>.
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IV. Significance of the Case
Why was South Africa, a country ripe with human rights
abuses, so easily able to outlaw anti-homosexuality laws while the
U.S. Supreme Court has been slow to react? 65 The reason appears
to be two-fold: (1) sexual orientation is specifically protected in
the South African Constitution;' 66 and (2) the South African
government has a desire to wash itself clean of its past human
rights atrocities and history of vile discrimination.'67
A. Specific Protection v. Equal Protection
The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution contains
only general equal protection and due process clauses. 68  It
therefore provides no specific protection to any class, including
race or gender.16 9 To provide substance to this amendment, the
U.S. Supreme Court chose to enforce equal protection by
providing varying degrees of protection from discriminatory laws
to different classes, depending on the characteristics of the classes
themselves. 7° When a law is neutral as to a "discrete and insular
minority,"'' the Court uses rational basis scrutiny to determine its
constitutionality.' If a law contains a gender bias, the Court often
165 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-96 (1986) (holding that anti-
sodomy laws are constitutional because homosexuality was against the morals of the
majority of the country and the history and tradition of the country was to punish
homosexual acts). However, following the National Coalition IH decision, the Georgia
Supreme Court held its laws prohibiting 'consensual, non-commercial acts of sexual
intimacy between adults to be unconstitutional under the state constitution's right of
privacy provisions. See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga. 1998). "We cannot
think of any other activity that reasonable persons would rank as more private and
deserving of protection from governmental interference than unforced, private, adult
sexual activity." Id. at 24.
166 See S. Afr. Const. ch. 2, § 9(3).
167 See id. pmbl. (recognizing past injustices and adapting the new constitution to
provide equal protection under the law for all citizens).
168 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
169 See id.
170 See generally United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 148-51 (1938)
(reviewing when a law of general applicability would violate the Fifth Amendment
guarantee of equal protection).
171 Id. at 153 n.4.
172 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-48 (1976). Under rational
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applies a form of intermediate scrutiny. 173  The highest form of
scrutiny, strict scrutiny, applies when a law expressly targets racial
minorities.'74 Additionally, under the due process clause, if a law
impinges on a right rooted in history and tradition, the Court will
strictly scrutinize any restrictions on that right.
175
Under this rubric of analysis, the Supreme Court has been able
to deny homosexuals any level of protection higher than rational
basis scrutiny. 116 Citing the history of discrimination against gays
and lesbians in the United States, the Supreme Court reasoned that
homosexuality acts were not "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition.' 177  Accordingly, the Court refused to
invalidate.the anti-sodomy laws using a strict scrutiny analysis.
7 1
Instead, the Court concluded that, morality was a rational basis
under which the government could justify the discriminatory
basis scrutiny, a law is presumed constitutional if it is rationally related to a legitimate
,government interest. See also N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592
n.39 (1979) (stating that "legislative classifications are valid unless they bear no rational
relationship to the State's objectives").-
'73 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 530-34 (1996) (invalidating
the continuation of single-sex education at Virginia Military Institute). A law which
differentiates based on gender survives scrutiny if the state offers an "exceedingly
persuasive" justification for the law. Id. at 532-33. Some commentators, however, have
argued that this "exceedingly persuasive" language elevates gender-based equal
protection analysis from intermediate scrutiny to strict scrutiny. Id. at 570-71 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
114 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (holding that "all
legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately
suspect"). The U.S. Supreme Court has always been more protective of racial
discriminaiion. Many commentators see the prevention of racial discrimination as the
original rationale behind the fourteenth amendment. See Carl E. Brody, Jr., A Historical
Review of Affirmative Action and the Interpretation of Its Legislative Intent by the
Supreme Court, 29 AKRON L. REV. 291, 332-33 (1996); Allan Ides, The Curious Case of
the Virginia Military Institute: An Essay on'the Judicial Function, 50 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 35, 41 (1993). The law with a racial classification can only survive if the
government has a compelling reason and the law is narrowly tailored to satisfy this
reason. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 603 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); cf. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 36.
"I See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1986) (holding that under
strict scrutiny a Connecticut statute forbidding the use of contraception violated the
marital right to privacy).
176 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986).
177 Id.
171 See id. at 195.
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In contrast, the South African Constitution not only has a
general Equal Protection Clause but also provides specific
protection for various classes, including sexual orientation.8
Accordingly, the South African judiciary has not been forced to
create an artificial system under which'they must apply various
levels of scrutiny to legislation."'1 Any law that directly or
indirectly discriminates on the basis of a protected class is
presumed unconstitutional.' 2 The only way the law survives is if
it is justified under the Limitations Clause.'83
Consequently, homosexuals in South Africa have had a much
easier time getting anti-sodomy laws declared unconstitutional
than their counterparts in the United States. In South Africa
homosexuals were not forced to prove that they were a class
worthy of constitutional protection, an issue replete with moral
controversy. Instead, the South African government had the
burden to justify why an openly discriminatory law could exist in
"an open and democratic society based on freedom and
equality."' It is a daunting task for any court or government to
justify such intrusive discrimination when the justification must be,
the "least restrictive means."'85 Consequently, the Constitutional
Court held the anti-sodomy laws unconstitutional.
8 6
179 See id. at 196. "[I]f all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be
invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed." Id.
180 See S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 9(3).
181 See National Coalition II, Case CCT 11/98, para. 55 (CC 1998) (visited Apr. 7,
1999) <http://www.law.wits.ac.za/judgements/1998/gayles.html>. "Our 1996
Constitution differs so substantially, as far as the present issue is concerned, from that of
the United States of America that the majority judgment in Bowers can really offer us no
assistance in the construction and application of our own Constitution." Id.
182 See id. (citing sections 10 and 14 of the South African Constitution).
183 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
184 National Coalition II, Case CCT 11/98 para. 34.
185 Id. "The criminalisation [sic] of sodomy in private between consenting males is
a severe limitation of a gay man's right to equality in relation to sexual orientation,
because it hits at one of the ways in which gays give expression to their sexual
orientation." Id. para. 36.
186 See id. para. 90.
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B. The Clean Hands Doctrine
Another rationale behind the South African Court's eagerness
to bring an end to homosexual discrimination was the nation's
long history of racial 'discrimination."' Apartheid was an
institution designed to separate the races as well as to keep the
races in a specific hierarchical order.188 Therefore, any new, post-
apartheid government opposed to the premise of apartheid could
only survive if the concept of discrimination as desirable was
eliminated. ' 9 In the light of decades of government sanctioned
apartheid, the framers of the new Constitution attempted to
denounce discrimination and to draft a constitution investing every
citizen with a sense of equal stature and worth. 190
Also in light of the framer's commitment to ending
discrimination, the Court was unwilling to rationalize unequal
treatment for homosexuals, even though most religions and the
majority of the nation were prejudiced against them. 9' The Court
declined to follow the lead of the U.S. Supreme Court 92 and
instead dismissed South Africa's history of homosexual
discrimination as prejudice and moral bigotry.' 93  Rather, the
Constitutional Court decided its task was to protect unpopular
minorities from discrimination.' Relying on a Canadian Supreme
Court decision, the Court reasoned:
It is easy to say that everyone who is just like "us" is entitled to
equality. Everyone finds it more difficult to say that those who
187 See Johnson, supra note 4, at 589.
88 See id. at 591.
189 See id. at 589. "The atrocities of past discrimination that characterized
apartheid-era South Africa instilled in the constitution's framers a commitment to end all
future discrimination." Id.
'90 See id.
'91 See National Coalition II, Case CCT 11/98 para. 37. The Court concluded that
while religious perversion to homosexuality was well documented, "however honestly
and sincerely held, [it] cannot influence what the Constitution dictates in regard to
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation." Id. para. 38.
192 See id. paras. 53-55; supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
193 See National Coalition II, Case CCT 11/98 para. 37. "The enforcement of the
private moral views of a section of the community, which are based to a large extent on
nothing more than prejudice, cannot qualify as such a legitimate purpose." Id.
19' See id. para. 25.
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are "different" from us in some way should have the same
equality rights that we enjoy. Yet so soon as we say
any... group is less deserving and unworthy of equal
protection and benefit of the law all minorities and all
of... society are demeaned.
95
The Court refused to continue to rely on the majority's history
of intolerance and instead chose to secure equality for all.1
96
C. A Break From the Past
One of the most significant aspects of the National Coalition
decisions is South Africa's decisive break from a culture that
supported homosexual discrimination. 97  Since European
colonization in the early eighteenth century, many black South
Africans have viewed homosexuality as an European concept.'9"
Therefore, it is somewhat surprising that in post-apartheid South
Africa, where blacks have vast political autonomy, human rights
advocates were able to garner broad-based support for inclusion of
sexual orientation as a protected class.199
In National Coalition I, the High Court noted that a "softening
in attitudes"' °  in the South African government toward
homosexuals occurred when the government recognized that "the
dignity and innate worth of every member of society [was] not a
matter of reluctant concession but [was] one of easy acceptance. '0 '
195 Id. para. 22 (quoting Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 156 D.L.R. 4th 385, 417 (Can.)).
196 See id. para. 37. The Dutch colonists began criminalizing sodomy in the
seventeenth century based on their moral interpretations of the Bible. See Johnson,
supra note 4, at 591-92.
197 See Thomas, supra note 7, at 380 (noting the difficulties African gays and
lesbians have faced in their attempts to gain constitutional protection for
homosexuality).
198 See id. at 381. Before colonialism black South Africans needed large traditional
families to increase agricultural production and efficiency. See id. When Europeans
changed the agrarian labor structure, the need for the traditional family was no longer as
prevalent. See id.
199 See Johnson, supra note 4, at 605. "On the floor of the constitutional debates
... there was very little discussion of the issue. Basically, only a small number of
speakers opposed including protection for gays and lesbians in the constitution." Id.
z0 National Coalition I, No. 97/023677, 1998 SACLR LEXIS 6, at *33 (High
Court, Witwatersrand Local Division, Aug. 5, 1998).
201 Id. at *35.
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The court concluded that this realization only occurs when people
accept three premises: (1) despite divergent moral views,
consensual homosexual conduct should not evoke social censure;
(2) homosexual orie ntation is not evidence of depravity; and (3)
homosexual orientation should not be a factor in'the distribution of
social goods.2  I
I° . . I
Both the High Court and the Constitutional Court recognized
the reality that many citizens had not yet adopted these premises
and did not support homosexual equality. °3 Nevertheless, the
courts decided that the Constitution did not permit personal bias to
dictate which groups deserved equal protection: °4 "This court
cannot allow itself to be diverted from its duty to act as an
independent arbiter of the Constitution by making choices on the
basis that they will find favour with the public."2 °5
Although both courts willingly eliminated laws in a counter-
majoritarian manner, they understood the possible limited effects
its decision would have on the public.2°6 The High Court noted
that while private biases exist and "may be outside the reach of the
law.... the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect. 2 7
The courts remained steadfast in their contention that prejudice
should not have "any role to play in constitutional adjudication. 2 8
202 See id. at *34-*35.
203 See id. at *35, *66; National Coalition II, Case CCT 11/98, para. 37 (CC 1998)
(visited Apr. 7, 1999) <http://www.law.wits.ac.za/judgements/1998/gayles.html>.
"Public opinion may have some relevance to the enquiry, but, in itself, is no substitute
for the duty vested in the courts to interpret the Constitution and to uphold its provisions
without fear or favour [sic]." National Coalition 1, 1998 SACLR LEXIS, at *66.
204 See National Coalition 1, 1998 SACLR LEXIS, at *66-*67; National Coalition
11, Case CCT 11/98 para. 37.
205 National Coalition 1, 1998 SACLR LEXIS, at *67. The Constitutional Court's
unwillingness to abide by public opinion is not a new phenomenon. In 1995 the Court
refused to uphold the death penalty as constitution in the face of a large amount of
public pressure and support for its retention. See State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR
391 (CC).
206 See National Coalition 1, 1998 SACLR LEXIS, at *69-*71; National Coalition
II, Case CCT 11/98 para. 37.
207 National Coalition 1, 1998 SACLR LEXIS, at *70-*7 1.
208 Id. at *70; see National Coalition II, Case CCT 11/98 para. 38.
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V. Conclusion
While the South African judiciary might be sympathetic to gay
and lesbian equality, only time can tell Whether its fellow citizens
will share its view.2°9 Several of South Africa's geographic
neighbors continue to ban and criminalize homosexual sex.210
Therefore, before there is true homosexual equality, more cases
like National Coalition II must spark and capture public debate to
inculcate the public with respect for homosexuals. The challenge
for legal advocates is then to bring the South African citizenry to
the same level of tolerance as the South African judiciary. Only
then will the citizens of South Africa provide homosexuals the
same protection from unconstitutional discrimination that the
Constitutional Court was so willing to give.
GREGORY R. KILPATRICK
209 See Johnson, supra note 4, at 585.
210 See James Wilets, International Human Rights Law and Sexual Orientation, 18
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1', 66 (1994). Sodomy laws still exist in Namibia,
Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, and 13 other African nations. See id.
211 See Johnson, supra note 4, at 585.
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